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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Mr. Eric Jason Hansen's judgment of conviction imd sentences for 
two counts of aggravated assault, enhanced by possession of a firearm during the commission of 
the offenses, and unlawfol possession of a firearm. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on a weekday in late September 2006, Olivia and her older 
brother Matt were waiting to cross Milwaukee at its intersection with Franklin Road on their way 
to the Boise Towne Square ("the mall"). Tr. p. 208, ln. 18 to p. 209, ln. 4; p. 210, ln. 10-20; p. 
250, ln. 17 to 251, ln. 2. Mr. Hansen was the passenger ofa vehicle waiting to tum north onto 
Milwaukee from the left turn lane on Franklin. Tr. p. 259, ln.13-24. The driver of the vehicle 
yelled at Olivia and a verbal exchange between Matt and the driver ensued. Tr. p. 224, ln. 19-21; 
p. 251, ln. 3-19; p. 253, ln. 1-14; p. 275, In. 3-18. The vehicle turned north on Milwaukee and 
Olivia and Matt crossed to the eastside of Milwaukee and walked north towards the mall. Tr. p. 
212, ln. 5-20; p. 214, ln. 1-8; p. 254, ln. 2-20. The vehicle turned around and returned south on 
Milwaukee towards Olivia and Matt. Tr. p. 215, In. 2-15. Tr. p. 215, ln. 21-24. As the vehicle 
came parallel with where Matt and Olivia were on the sidewalk, Mr. Hansen shot a gun into the 
alf. Tr. p. 216, In. 5-8; p. 258, ln. 12-21; p. 259, In. 8-11; p. 288, ln. 10-14. 
The state charged Mr. Hansen with two counts of aggravated assault for allegedly 
threatening to do violence to Matt and Olivia with a firearm, which created a well-founded fear 
that such violence was imminent. R. 22-25. The state also alleged that Mr. Hansen displayed a 
firearm during the commission of the offenses for purposes of the sentencing enhancement set 
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forth in LC.§ 19-2520. Id. The state further alleged that, because Mr. Hansen had been 
previously convicted of a felony, he unlawfully possessed a firearm. Id. 
A jury found Mr. Hansen guilty of both counts of aggravated assault, the firearm 
enhancement and being a felon in possession of a firearm. R. 122-25. The district court 
sentenced Mr. Hansen to a determinate five year term of confinement on the first count of 
aggravated assault. For the second count of aggravated assault enhanced by the use of a firearm, 
the district court imposed a consecutive unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of 
confinement of five years. For unlawful possession of a firearm, the district court imposed a 
consecutive, indeterminate tem1 of five years. R. 149. This timely appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Was there sufficient evidence to support the verdicts? 
B. Must Mr. Hansen's judgment of conviction be vacated because the jury 
instructions failed to require the state to prove the element of intent and there was evidence that 
could have rationally led the jury to conclude Mr. Hansen did not specifically intend to threaten 
to commit violence on Olivia and Matt with a firearm? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Verdicts 
This Court will set aside a jury's finding of guilt where the state failed to present 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 
(Ct. App. 2006); State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 27,909 P.2d 637,645 (Ct.App.1996). This 
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Medina, 128 Idaho at 
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27,909 P.2d at 645; State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,572,826 P.2d 919,921 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The state alleged that Mr. Hansen committed an aggravated assault by threatening to do 
violence to Matt and Olivia with a firearm, which created a well-founded fear that such violence 
was imminent. See also I.C. §§ 18-90l(b ), 18-905(b). Thus, the state was not simply obligated 
to prove that Mr. Hansen threatened Olivia and Matt with violence and, instead, it was obligated 
to prove that he threatened to do violence with the firearm. However, construing the facts in the 
prosecution's favor, Mr. Hansen fired a gun into the air while looking at Matt and Olivia across 
at least two lanes of traffic during rush hour. These circumstances are insufficient to support a 
finding that Mr. Hansen intended to threaten to shoot Matt or Olivia or that they could have 
reasonably believed such a threat was imminent. 
From their place on the sidewalk, Olivia and Matt were closest to northbound traffic 
whereas the vehicle was headed south at the time a shot was fired into the air. Thus, two busy 
lanes of traffic, a tum lane and the vehicle's driver were between Mr. Hansen and where Olivia 
and Matt stood on the sidewalk. Tr. p. 285, ln. 17 top. 286, In. 8. No words were spoken prior 
to the shots being fired. Tr. p. 259, ln. 6-7. Neither Matt nor Olivia indicated that Mr. Hansen 
pointed the gun at them. The vehicle was still moving at the time the shots were fired. Tr. p. 
218, In. 1-5. Matt was frightened but did not testify he believed he was in danger of getting shot. 
Tr.p.260,ln.17-19. 
The evidence introduced at trial was insufficient as a matter oflaw to establish that Mr. 
Hansen threatened to do violence to Olivia and Matt with the firearm or that Matt or Olivia 
reasonably believed such violence was imminent. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence 
to support the jury's guilty verdicts of aggravated assault and Mr. Hansen's conviction must be 
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vacated. 
B. Mr. Hansen's Judgment of Conviction must be Vacated Because the Jury 
Instructions Failed to Require the State to Prove that Mr. Hansen Intended to 
Threaten to do Violence to Olivia and Matt with a Firearm and there was Evidence 
that could have Rationally Led the Jury to Conclude Mr. Hansen did not Intend to 
Threaten to Harm Olivia and.Matt with the Firearm 
1. Facts Pertaining to Argument 
The district court instructed the jury to find Mr. Hansen guilty if it concluded he 
committed an assault on Matt and Olivia by threatening them with a firearm. Jury Instructions' 
(JI) Nos. 16, 21. The jury was informed that: 
Assault is committed when a person: 
(1) unlawfully attempts, with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another; or 
(2) intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to 
the person of another, with an apparent ability to do so, and does some act 
which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is 
imminent. 
JI No. 26. The district court informed the jury that "intent under Idaho law is not an intent to 
commit a crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the act committed." JI No. 32. 
The district court further instructed the jury that: '"Wilfully' when applied to the intent with 
which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or 
make the omission referred to." JI No. 34. 
2. Why Relief Should be Granted 
To prove that Mr. Hansen committed aggravated assault as charged by the state, the state 
was required to prove that he specifically intended to threaten Olivia and Matt with the firearm. 
1 The jury instructions are an exhibit to the record. R. 186-87. 
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However, the district court's instructions permitted the jury to find Mr. Hansen guilty of 
aggravated assault based on a general, rather than specific, intent standard. Accordingly, the jury 
instructions violated Mr. Hansen's right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution because they 
relieved the state of its burden to prove the intent element beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
The omission of an essential element from a jury instruction is not harmless if the record 
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted 
element. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. l, 19 (1999); State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 178, 
191 P.3d 1098, 1101 (2008). The district court's error is therefore reversible because the 
evidence could have rationally led the jury to conclude that Mr. Hansen did not intend to do 
violence to Olivia and Matt with the firearm and that by firing into the air he was simply showing 
off. 
a. assault under Section 901 (b) requires specific intent to threaten and 
therefore the district court committed fundamental error by 
instructing the jury on general intent 
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616,619, 130 P.3d 1154, l 157 (Ct. App. 
2005). Mr. Hansen's trial attorney failed to object to the jury instructions. See Tr. pp. 548-53. 
Nevertheless, fundamental error - including jury instruction error - is reviewable for the first 
time on appeal. Hickman, 146 Idaho at 178, 191 P.3d at 1101; State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 
749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts the trial 
that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due 
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process. Anderson, 170P.3dat89l;Statev. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842,844,828 P.2d 871,873 
(1992). 
Where the trial court fails to instruct the jury that commission of the crime requires 
specific intent, there is constitutional error because the jury did not have the opportunity to find 
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 
F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000); United States. v. Pei Lin, 139 F.3d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Jury instructions that fail to require the state to prove every element of the offense violate due 
process and, thus, rise to the level of fundamental error. Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 
892; see also Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433,437 (2004). 
Idaho statute defines two modes of committing an assault: (1) an "attempt based" assault 
as defined in LC.§ 18-90l(a) and (2) a "threat based" assault as defined in LC.§ 18-90l(b), 
which is committed when a person makes a threat to do violence to another, has the apparent 
ability to do so and creates a well-founded fear in another person that such violence is imminent. 
See also State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 45, 13 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ct. App. 2000). Here, the state 
accused Mr. Hansen of committing a "threat based" assault by threatening to do violence to Matt 
and Olivia with the firearm. 
The "threat based" assault defined in Section 901 (b) requires the state to prove that the 
defendant intended to make a threat to do violence to another. State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 373, 
79 P.3d 729, 732 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888,891, 55 P.3d 881,884 (Ct. 
App. 2002). Thus, Section 90l(b) requires a state of mind- to threaten- which in part defines 
and is an element of the crime. Accordingly, Section 90l(b) defines a specific intent crime. See 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,926,866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) (a specific intent requirement refers 
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to that state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof). 
Conversely, the district court instructed the jury that intent is not an intent to commit a 
crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the act committed and that wilfully simply 
implies a purpose or willingness to commit the act. JI Nos. 32, 34. These instructions describe 
"general intent." Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d atl83 (general criminal intent requirement 
satisfies if it is shown that the defendant lmowingly performed the proscribed acts). The general 
intent instructions were inconsistent with and contrary to Section 90l(b)'s requirement that the 
state prove that the defendant intended to threaten and, thus, intended to commit assault. As 
instructed, the jury was not required to conclude that Mr. Hansen intended to threaten to do 
violence to Olivia and Matt with the fireann by firing the gun into the air and, instead, was 
permitted to find him guilty based on its conclusion that Mr. Hansen intended to fire the gun, 
regardless of his intentions in so doing. 
As a result of these defects in the instructions, the state was relieved of its burden to 
prove the element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Fei Lin, 139 F.3d at 1309. Because 
"such circumstances qualify as a clear instance of manifest injustice," the error was fundamental. 
Anderson, 170 P .3d at 892. 
b. the jury instruction error was not harmless because there was 
evidence that could have rationally Jed the jury to conclude Mr. 
Hausen did not specifically intend to threaten to harm Olivia and 
Matt with the firearm when he shot into the air 
An error implicating the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
reversible unless the court is convinced t11at the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 7; Anderson, 170 P.3d at 892. 1n deciding whether an error is harmless, 
courts must evaluate whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of 
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might have contributed to the conviction. Anderson, 170 P .3d at 892. A defendant is prejudiced 
when a jury is not instructed as to an element of an offense and the record contains evidence that 
could rationally lead to a finding in favor of the defendant with respect to the omitted element. 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19; State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155, 158, 139 P.3d 757, 760 (Ct. App. 
2006). Thus, an error is not harmless when the defendant contested the omitted element and 
raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. 
"The reviewing court must ever bear in mind that criminal defendants have a 
constitutional right to have a jury, not appellate court judges on review, decide guilt or 
innocence." State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, l 003 (N.M. 2004). Thus, the court conducting the 
harmless-error inquiry does not "become in effect a second jury to determine whether the 
defendant is guilty." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, citing R. Traynor, The Riddle ofHaimless Error 50 
(1970). "It is imperative that a reviewing court be guided not by its own assessment of the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant- a matter which is irrelevant to the question whether the 
constitutional error might have contributed to the jury's verdict - but rather by an objective 
reconstruction of the record of evidence the jury either heard or should have heard absent the 
error and a careful exaI11inatio11 of the error's possible impact on that evidence." Johnson, 98 
P.3d at 1003; see also Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (harmless error analysis 
requires the court to determine that the error did not contribute to the conviction); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might 
have contributed to the conviction); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963) (same). 
Accordingly, the focus of the haimless error inquiry is not whether there was overwhelming 
evidence to support the verdict but, rather, whether the omitted element was contested and 
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whether the defendant raised sufficient evidence to support a finding in his favor with respect to 
that element. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 19; see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (noting California 
court's "overemphasis" on its view of overwhelming evidence); Johnson, 98 P.3d at I 004 
( strength of prosecution's case but one factor with central focus of inquiry on whether error 
might have affected verdict). 
Here, the state alleged that Mr. Hansen committed an assault by threatening Olivia and 
Matt "with a firearm." However, the jury could have rationally concluded that, although Mr. 
Hansen intended to fire the gun, he did not do so with the intent to threaten to harm Matt and 
Olivia with the firearm. Indeed, the underlying circumstances suggest it was highly unlikely that 
Mr. Hansen would have targeted Olivia and Matt with the gun. The encounter between the 
vehicle and Olivia and Matt occurred during rush hour traffic in one the busiest areas of Boise. 
Three lanes and extensive traffic sat between Mr. Hansen and Olivia and Matt. Tr. p. 255, In. 6-
9, p. 227, ln. 16-25, pp. 285, ln. 23 to 286, ln. 8. Neither Olivia nor Matt testified that any words 
were spoken prior to the shot being fired. See Tr. p. 217, In. 1-22; p. 259, 6-7. This evidence 
was sufficient to suppmi a finding that Mr. Hansen did not intend to threaten to hann Olivia and 
Matt with the firearm and, instead, intended to shoot the gun into the air to show off or to initiate 
a fist fight, which although illegal, would not constitute an aggravated assault. 
Mr. Hansen contested his intent to threaten Olivia and Matt with the firearm at trial and 
evidence was introduced which could have rationally led the jury to find in his favor on that 
element. Accordingly, it is not possible to say that the erroneous jury instruction did not 
contribute to the verdict and Mr. Hansen's judgment of conviction and sentences must be 
vacated. 
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V .. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hansen respectfolly asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
sentences and either enter a judgment of acquittal or remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this£ day of January, 2009 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Eric J. Hansen 
Robyn Fyffe . 
Attorney for Eric J. Hansen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .Zf'~ay of January 2009, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-00!0. 
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